The Baton Rouge police officer, identified in the lawsuit as "John Doe," alleged in his lawsuit that he responded to a demonstration that took place on July 9, 2016. Doe contends that Defendant DeRay Mckesson "le[]d the protest," "acting on behalf of" Defendant "Black Lives Matter." Doe alleged that "Black Lives Matter" is a "national unincorporated association," of which Mckesson is a "leader and co-founder."
Does alleged that Mckesson and "Black Lives Matter" "were in Baton Rouge for the purpose of demonstrating, protesting[,] and rioting to incite others to violence against police and other law enforcement officers." Doe concedes that the demonstration "was peaceful" when it commenced. But Doe contends that "the protest turned into a riot," when "activist[s] began pumping up the crowd." Thereafter, according to Doe, demonstrators allegedly "began to loot a Circle K," taking "water bottles" from the business and "hurl[ing]" them at the police officers who were positioned at the demonstration. Once the demonstrators had exhausted their supply of water bottles, Doe contends that an unidentified demonstrator "picked up a piece of concrete or [a] similar rock[-]like substance and hurled [it] into the police." Does alleges he was struck by this object, causing several serious injuries.
Doe's suit named Mckesson and "Black Lives Matter" as Defendants. In his Complaint, Doe contends that Mckesson and "Black Lives Matter" "knew or should have known that the physical contact[,] riot[,] and demonstration that they staged would become violent . . . and . . . that violence would result." Doe contends that the unidentified demonstrator who threw the object was "a member of . . . Black Lives Matter" and was "under the control and custody" of Mckesson and "Black Lives Matter." Therefore, according to Doe, Mckesson and "Black Lives Matter" "are liable for the injuries caused to" Doe by the unidentified demonstrator.
Doe faced what turned out to be two insurmountable hurdles to his lawsuit. First, as to Mckesson, "[t]he First Amendment . . . restricts the ability" of a tort plaintiff to recover damages from "an individual solely because of his association with another." The court ruled that "[c]ivil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence." And it noted that "[f]or liability to be imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims." Here, Doe failed to allege facts that Mckesson had any intent other than to lead a peaceful protest. Doe's conclusory allegations that Mckesson "was in charge of the protests[,] and he was seen and heard giving orders throughout the day and night of the protests" were insufficient. As the court noted, "[Doe] does not state in his Complaint how Mckesson allegedly incited violence or what orders he allegedly was giving." Doe's threadbare recitals were not enough to overcome the Constitution's protection for the right to associate.
As to Black Lives Matter, the court concluded that "'Black Lives Matter,' as [Doe] uses that term in his Complaint, refers to a social movement. Although many entities have utilized the phrase 'black lives matter' in their titles or business designations, 'Black Lives Matter' itself is not an entity of any sort. Therefore, all claims against 'Black Lives Matter' must be dismissed because social movements lack the capacity to be sued." As the court noted, "'Black Lives Matter' was not created through a 'contract of association' and is not an 'entity whose personality 'is distinct from that of its members,' and therefore it is not a 'juridical person' that is capable of being sued.
I suspect Doe will appeal this decision, but for now, the right of association lives in Louisiana.